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Abstract: This article examines the resource management design of international courts (ICs) 
and asks: how are ICs designed in terms of the management of resources and what factors 
contribute the resource management design of ICs? Theoretically, this article draws on 
existing literature to conceptualize resource management as a design feature of international 
courts and considers three causal mechanisms that might shape the resource management 
design of ICs: diffusion by emulation, the uploading of domestic governance norms, and 
bureaucrats who pursue institutional independence and sustainability. Empirically, I examine 
the resource management design of 24 ICs and assess who selects ICs’ chief administrators 
and approves ICs’ budgets. A case study on the Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ) is also 
analyzed in order to gain traction on the causal mechanisms generating resource management 
design of ICs. The article shows that there is strong tendency for ICs to have greater control 
over the appointment of their chief administrators, but less control over their budgets. States 
generally retain authority to approve ICs’ budgets. Moreover, it suggests that domestic 
judicial norms and national legal bureaucrats influenced the design of the CCJ’s resource 
management.  
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States have increasingly recognized international courts (ICs) to be crucial to global 
governance. As a result, we have witnessed their proliferation. Today, policy makers and 
academics contemplate the creation of additional courts. Ongoing debates in the area of 
international investment buzz with ideas for the creation of world investment court and in 
some circles a global human rights court has gained traction (Scheinin, 2012). Yet when states 
establish international courts, they face several questions concerning how to design them. One 
set of questions pertains to their resourcing. How should the resources of a court be governed? 
Who should control the budgets of ICs? How should administrative staff be selected and to 
whom are they responsible?  
Despite begin among the essential design choices that states must concern themselves 
with when creating new international courts, we know little about the resource management 
design, or the rules governing the control of their resources. This is somewhat surprising 
because existing literature has examined how ICs are financed (Ingadottir, 2004; Ingadottir, 
2014; Romano, 2005; Wippman, 2006) and the resourcing of ICs might have consequences 
for the processes by which IC operate and the outcomes they produce. This article responds to 
this gap in the literature by examining resource management, conceived as a dimension of 
institutional design. Specifically, I ask two questions concerning the governance of ICs’ 
material and human resources. First, how are ICs designed in terms of the management of 
resources? Second, what factors contribute to the resource management design of ICs?  
Theoretically, this article draws on existing literature to conceptualize resource 
management as a design feature of international courts. The article develops an explanatory 
account of the causal mechanisms that shape resource management design. Three causal 
mechanisms are considered: diffusion by emulation, the uploading of domestic governance 
norms, and bureaucrats who pursue institutional independence and sustainability.  Empirically, 
I examine the resource management design of international courts, defined as permanent 
international judicial bodies that: (1) makes decisions on the basis of international law, (2) 
follow pre-determined rules of procedure, (3) issue legally binding outcomes, (4) are 
composed of independent members, and (5) require at least one party to a dispute is a state or 
an international organization (Romano et al. 2014, p. 6).1 The article assesses two central 
rules on resource management of 24 ICs, which comprise all permanent international courts 
that have been operational in the time period from 1945 to 2014. These two rules define who 
selects ICs’ chief administrators and approves ICs’ budgets. A case study on the design of the 
Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ) is also analyzed to help adjudicate between the causal 
mechanisms accounting for resource management design.  
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The analysis reveals that ICs tend to have greater control over the selection of their 
chief administrators than over their budgets. States generally retain authority to approve IC 
budgets. At the same time, the analysis reveals there is also variation across ICs. The 
similarities in resource management design of ICs accord with a prominent account that 
international court is the result diffusion by emulation. However, the findings of variation also 
suggest this is not complete account.  Based on a case study that deviates from the 
expectations of diffusion, the empirical analysis highlights domestic factors also contribute to 
institutional design. In particular, I argue that the uploading of domestic governance norms 
and bureaucrats’ efforts to ensure the independence and sustainability of new international 
courts helps to explain additional variation in resource management design.  
The article is organized in four sections. In the first section, the article conceptualizes 
resource management as a feature of institutional design and measures and comparatively 
maps the resource management design of ICs. The second section identifies and develops 
three causal mechanisms that might account for the design of resource management. The third 
section then tests the plausibility of these causal mechanisms through a case study on the CCJ. 
In the fourth and final section, the article concludes with a discussion of the core findings and 
their implications. 
 
 
International Courts and Resource Management as Institutional Design 
 
Previous research has studied the design of international courts, especially along the 
dimensions of access for private litigants, independence, selection and tenure of judges, and 
powers (Alter, 2014; Deitelhoff, 2009; Keohane et al., 2000; Mackenzie et al., 2010). In this 
section, I elaborate on how resource management constitutes a dimension of the institutional 
design and what it comprises. In addition, I measure and comparatively assess the resource 
management of all 24 ICs that were operational through the end of 2014.  
 Resource management, or rules defining what actors have control over the 
management of resources, is a dimension of institutional design, similar to other aspects 
related to financing and resource governance of IOs (Graham, 2015, 2016; Johnson, 2014).  
Like other dimensions of institutional design, such as membership criteria, the scope of issues 
covered, and access for transnational actors, resource management rules shape how 
international institutions operate. In terms of rational design, resource management is part of 
what defines and structures ‘control’ within an international institution (Koremenos et al., 
4 
 
2001, p. 772).  The rules defining the control of resources, in other words, influence the 
authority and accountability of institutions.  
The resource management of ICs concerns two types of resources (Keohane et al., 
2000).  First, resource management includes a court’s material resources. Control over 
material resources enables an actor to decide on the priorities and distribution of funds. 
Resource management thus encompasses the rules governing the budgetary process of ICs, 
such as those specifying who proposes and approves an IC’s budget. Different actors are 
likely to have different preferences over the allocation of funds and budget priorities. For 
example, a court might prefer to prioritize outreach programs and funding for witnesses, while 
states prioritize rapid processing of cases. These are only some of the ways in which 
budgeting priorities and allocation of funds can differ depending on who has control to 
approve budgets.  
Second, resource management also relates to human resources, or the staff and 
personnel of an IC. Arguably, the most important human resource assignment (aside from 
judges) of international courts is the principal administrator, most often called the registrar or 
secretary (herein referred to as a registrar). Registrars’ duties and responsibilities vary, but 
most often include legal responsibilities, diplomatic responsibilities as well as managerial and 
administrative tasks (Cartier and Hoss, 2014). For example, a registrar may be the first step in 
determining if a case is admissible, overseeing communication between disputing parties and 
the filing of legal documentation. They also act as a public representative for the court, 
manage court personnel and implement budgets. Some registrars operate under the 
supervision of the president of an IC, while others are under the direct supervision of states 
(Cartier and Hoss, 2014).  
Two related aspects of IC resourcing should be mentioned, even though they are not 
included in the analysis here. The selection and appointment of judges, as well as the terms 
and conditions of their office (e.g., salaries, pensions, etc.) might be seen as an aspect of 
resource management. I however exclude them here because the selection and tenure of 
judges is part of a much larger question about judicial independence. To include the judges’ 
selection and terms of office, therefore would stretch the concept of resource management, 
arguably, and conflate it with judicial independence, which by most accounts is conceptually 
distinct. How courts are funded also speaks to the resourcing of ICs. However, who funds ICs 
is less an issue of institutional design than the budgetary process. While the assessment of 
states’ contributions and whether voluntary contributions are permitted can be expressed in 
formal rules, funding is much more ad hoc. For example, new (voluntary) funders come and 
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go as their priorities change. Also, the financing of ICs is very often entangled within a larger 
international organization (Ingadottir, 2004, pp. 600-604), and therefore, their funding is not 
strictly a design feature of ICs, but of the larger organization. For this reason, funding merits 
separate analysis.   
  
Mapping Resource Management of ICs 
 To comparatively map the resource management design of ICs, I assess the formal 
rules governing the material and human resources for each IC. Specifically, I identify the 
provisions in the constitutive documents (treaty, statute, rules of procedure, etc.) that specify 
who approves each IC’s budget and selects its registrar. Based on these provisions, each IC is 
categorized according to whether its budget and registrar are decided upon by: (1) states, (2) a 
joint decision of states and court, (3) the court, or (4) other entity. A decision by states 
typically transpires through an intergovernmental decision-making body of an IO or a meeting 
of state parties. The category of ‘joint decision’ typically involves the proposal, 
recommendation or consultation of the court, followed by approval or adoption by states 
through an intergovernmental decision-making body.  The category of ‘decided by court’ 
includes instances where budget approval or the selection of the registrar is by the court as a 
whole or by the president of the court. The category of ‘other entity’ is usually another organ 
of the international organization in which the IC is embedded, such as a secretariat, which is 
not an intergovernmental body comprised of state representatives. Using this categorization 
scheme, I then compare how ICs are designed with regard to the management of their 
resources. The appendix lists all ICs and the categorization of each provision.  
Table 1 depicts the overall pattern in resource management design and table 2 shows 
how each IC is categorized. Table 1 reveals two central tendencies in the design of IC 
resource management. First, states control the budgets of most ICs, as they have final 
authorization over the budgets of ICs. In fact, states have final say on the budgets of ICs in 23 
ICs out of 24. Yet in half of all ICs, the formal rules provide that the courts must be consulted 
in the formulation of their budgets, even though states give final approval.2 In contrast to this 
tendency, there is only one court – the Caribbean Court of Justice – for which control over the 
budget is not subject to state approval (table 2).  
 
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
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Second, in contrast to control over budgets, most courts select their registrars. 
Fourteen ICs have autonomy over the selection of the registrar. In another four, the court is 
consulted. In seven others, the court is consulted on the appointment, regardless of whether 
another entity or states make the final decision (see table 2). For instance, the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and Rwanda (ICTR) recommend their 
registrars while the Secretary-General of the United Nation makes the final appointment. In 
the case of the CCJ, the body responsible for the selection of the registrar is chaired by the 
President of the Court. Conversely, states have sole authority to select the registrar of only 
two ICs.  
 
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Table 2 suggests that there are two dominant models, which together account for 58% 
of all ICs. The first model for resource management entails high state control over budgets 
with high court control over the selection of the registrar. This model applies in six ICs, and 
with the exception of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) occurs in only regional 
integration courts. The second model combines court consultation on the budget and high 
court control over the selection of the registrar. This model is found in the design of eight ICs 
(approximately 33%).  This model occurs in regional integration courts, regional human rights 
courts and two global courts. Of the sixteen possible combinations of rules governing the 
management of resources, only nine occur. While we can observe two dominant models, table 
2 also illustrates that several ICs represent unique combinations of the rules. For example, in 
only one IC have states relinquished control over both the budget and the appointment of the 
registrar – the CCJ. Also, only in the case of the East African Court of Justice (EACJ) do 
states have full autonomy over resource management. 
 
 
Explaining the Design of Resource Management 
 
How can we explain ICs’ resource management design and what accounts for the comparative 
patterns we observe? Why do some ICs have greater influence over their budgets than others? 
What determines whether states will relinquish control over the selection of an IC’s registrar? 
Existing literature suggests that the design of international courts is significantly determined 
by a process of diffusion by emulation (Alter 2012; Lenz 2012). This account builds on a 
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broader literature that identifies diffusion as a factor shaping the design of international 
institutions (Börzel and Risse, 2012; Ovodenko and Keohane, 2012). Diffusion in particular 
explains that a convergence in institutional design is caused by an underlying interdependence 
between institutions. Similarities in design are not independent developments that occur by 
mere chance, but rather the result of one institution having causal influence over the design of 
others. Emulation has been identified as a particularly important mechanism of diffusion, 
whereby an institution’s creators draw lessons from existing institutions. Specifically, they try 
to replicate the design of existing institutions that have demonstrated effectiveness in the past 
in a functionally similar context (Ovodenko and Keohane, 2012).  
The logic of diffusion by emulation has been applied to the design of international 
courts. When ICs have been newly established, court creators have emulated the design of 
existing international courts, drawing lessons from existing, well-functioning established 
courts (Alter, 2012). Alter argues that most newly established international courts, especially 
those established within common market systems, have been modeled on the Court of Justice 
of the European Union (CJEU, also known as the European Court of Justice (ECJ)). 
According to this account, we would expect ICs within similarly functional context – like 
problem structures and issue areas – to share similar resource management designs. For 
example, regional integration courts like the CJEU will most likely have a resource 
management design that resembles that of the CJEU.  
Recalling the descriptive patterns discussed in the previous section, the logic of 
diffusion by emulation is especially adept to account for some of the central tendencies we 
observe in resource management design. It most likely is influential to explaining the two 
dominant models identified in table 2. Nevertheless, there were several instances of ICs that 
did not correspond to these models, and for which the logic of diffusion by emulation is hard-
pressed to explain. How can we understand these other instances of design? What other causal 
mechanism might affect the resource management design of ICs?  In this section, I discuss 
two additional causal mechanisms that might contribute to resource management design, 
especially the cases that diverge from the expectations of the diffusion logic.  These two 
causal mechanisms are the uploading of domestic governance norms and bureaucrats’ 
interests for institutional independence and sustainability. 
First, the design of international courts might be influenced by the uploading of 
domestic governance norms.  This mechanism assumes that states seek to have their domestic 
governance norms replicated or reflected in international governance. This explanation builds 
on the core argument of liberal institutionalism that states’ international preferences are 
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shaped by domestic norms (Moravcsik, 1997). A variety of literature has suggested that 
domestic governance norms do influence the design of international institutions. For example, 
domestic ideational and normative considerations contribute to design of regional 
organizations (Acharya et al., 2007). Also, domestic participatory norms affect whether IOs 
will be designed to grant access to transnational actors (Tallberg et al., 2016).  
A similar process of uploading of domestic governance norms may account for the 
observed variation in the resource management design of ICs. If domestic governance norms 
influence the design of ICs, states will prefer international courts to resemble their domestic 
judiciaries. In others words, domestic judiciaries could be an important source of inspiration 
for how states design international courts. For example, states where judiciaries enjoy greater 
independence from executive and legislative control may prefer international judicial bodies 
that are similarly insulated from political influence. States with domestic judiciaries that are 
less insulated from political pressure, on the other hand, may prefer international courts that 
are subject to stricter state controls. Moreover, the uploading of domestic governance norms is 
more likely to occur when a larger proportion of member states share similar norms. If a large 
proportion of states have common judicial institutions or norms, they are more likely to be 
reflected in the design of the international court. Thus, if uploading of domestic governance 
norms influences the design of international courts, we would expect domestic judicial norms 
to be replicated in their resource management design.  
 Second, the design of international courts might also be influenced by the interests of 
bureaucrats who participate in the design process. Johnson (2014) shows that international 
bureaucrats often participate in and influence the design of international institutions. 
According to Johnson, international bureaucrats’ interests include ensuring that their 
‘organizational family’ is designed with sufficient material security, legitimacy and capacity 
to advance policy. Consequently, when they are engaged in the design process, they promote 
design features that minimize state control over the institution. When international 
bureaucrats have been influential in the creation of new institutions, these institutions tend to 
have fewer and weaker means for state control. 
National bureaucrats involved in the establishment of international institutions might 
behave similarly when it comes to the design of international institutions that will function 
within their own organizational family. In particular, national legal and judicial officials can 
have interests in ensuring the independence, legitimacy and material security of their 
international counterparts. The authority and independence of national judiciaries can be 
enhanced with the rise of independent and authoritative international court (Alter, 2001). In 
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other words, international courts and national judiciaries can share a symbiotic relationship. 
For this reason, national bureaucrats or government officials who are part of a national 
judiciary may have self-interests to ensure that an international court is designed to have 
independence, legitimacy and material security. Thus, when they are involved in the design of 
an IC, we would expect an IC resource management design to reflect higher court control 
over resources. 
 
 
Empirical Analysis: Resource Management at the CCJ 
 
This section examines the three causal mechanisms in the formation of the CCJ. 
Existing research has shown that diffusion by emulation accounts for the design of some ICs 
and certain design features. Yet, diffusion is especially adept at explaining similarities in 
design, but less so instances of divergence or unique design. To improve our understanding of 
what lies behind these latter instances of design, a deviant case is ideal. A deviant case is one 
that demonstrates a surprising value for a specific theory (Gerring 2007, p. 105). It is useful 
for exploring anomalies, and “is usually to probe for new – but as yet unspecified – 
explanations” (Gerring 2007, p. 106). As a regional integration court, the CCJ’s unique 
resource management design is striking because it differs from its counterparts embedded in 
other regional integration organizations. Thus, as a case with unique resource management 
design, the case study acts as a sort of hard case for the diffusion by emulation logic and as a 
plausibility probe for the alternative explanations (Levy, 2008). In addition to the theoretical 
benefit the CCJ offers as a case study, this court has been minimally studied, so the case study 
provides an empirical contribution.  
The case study builds on a variety of data, including primary sources (legal 
instruments, official reports and documents, etc.) and in-depth interviews which I conducted 
in March and April 2016. Secondary resources also contribute to the analysis. In the absence 
of additional case studies, I draw on bivariate analysis of the IC resource management design 
data and relevant, existing datasets to make preliminary assessments about the case study’s 
generalizability. 
 
The Caribbean Court of Justice and its Resource Management Design 
The Caribbean Court of Justice was established by member states of the Caribbean 
Community (CARICOM) in 2001 and became operational in 2005. CARICOM is a regional 
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integration organization including fifteen member states, most of which are English speaking, 
former British colonies. The CCJ was created with a two-fold set of purposes. The first 
purpose was to provide the CARICOM nations with a supreme court. As former British 
colonies, several states at independence did not establish their own national supreme courts, 
and rather constitutionally recognized the UK’s Judicial Committee of the Privy Council as 
their court of last resort. While the idea of creating a supreme court for the Caribbean 
circulated among political elites over a long period of time following independence (Birdsong, 
2005), the creation of the CCJ in the early 21st century brought this idea to fruition.3 Today, 
the CCJ has appellate jurisdiction, acting for as a supreme constitutional court, for members 
of CARICOM that accept this jurisdiction.4 The second purpose of the CCJ is to interpret and 
apply CARICOM’s founding treaty, the Treaty of Chaguaramas, originally adopted in 1973 
and amended in 2002. The CCJ has compulsory and exclusive jurisdiction over the Treaty of 
Chaguaramas, which comprises its original jurisdiction.5   
 The CCJ’s resource management design is unique (see table 2). Neither the selection 
of the registrar nor the budget is decided upon by the Court or the member states. Rather, 
control over the CCJ’s resources lies with other organizational entities: the Regional Judicial 
and Legal Services Commission (RJLSC) and the Trust Fund of the CCJ.  
First, the Registrar of the CCJ is selected by the RJLSC, which is an organizational 
body created by the Agreement establishing the Caribbean Court of Justice (herein CCJ 
Treaty). The RJLSC is composed of eleven members, which are: 
(a) the President [of the Court] …; (b) two persons nominated jointly by the 
Organisation of the Commonwealth Caribbean Bar Association (OCCBA) and the 
Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) Bar Association; (c) one chairman 
of the Judicial Services Commission of a Contracting Party selected in rotation…; (d) 
the Chairman of a Public Service Commission of a Contracting Party selected in 
rotation…; (e) two persons from civil society … (f) two distinguished jurists 
nominated; and (g) two persons nominated jointly by the Bar or Law Associations of 
the Contracting Parties (CARICOM, 2001, Art. 5(1)). 
The RJLSC’s composition is distinguishable from an intergovernmental body. Rather than 
being composed of state representatives, its members are a combination of public officials, 
legal professionals and academics, and civil society representatives.6  
The CCJ Treaty specifies the responsibilities of the RJLSC. In particular, it provides 
that it has responsibility for ‘(b) making appointments of those officials and employees [of the 
registry] and for determining the salaries and allowances to be paid to such officials and 
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employees; (c) the determination of the terms and conditions of service of officials and 
employees; and (d) the termination of appointments…’ (CARICOM, 2001, Art. 5(3)(1)). Thus, 
the registrar of the CCJ is selected by the RJLSC, not by a state organ or the court itself.  
 The second organizational body related to resource management of CCJ is its Trust 
Fund. In order to fund the CCJ, the CARICOM states, with the assistance of the Caribbean 
Development Bank, established a Trust Fund with an initial capital investment of $100 
million. The investment income of the fund provides the financial resources for the CCJ. The 
Trust Fund operates under the direction of a Board of Trustees. The members of the Board of 
Trustees include:  
Secretary-General of CARICOM; the Vice-Chancellor of the University of the West 
Indies; The President of the Insurance Association of the Caribbean; The Chairman of 
the Association of Indigenous Banks of the Caribbean; The President of the Caribbean 
Institute of Chartered Accountants; The President of the Organisation of 
Commonwealth Caribbean Bar Associations; The Chairman of the Conference of 
Heads of the Judiciary of Member States of the Caribbean Community; The President 
of the Caribbean Association of Industry and Commerce; and The President of the 
Caribbean Congress of Labour (CARICOM, 2004, Art. 6). 
Like the RJLSC, the Trust Fund is directed by individuals representing various sectors, 
including the banking industry, labor, academics, and the legal profession. Also, none of the 
Trustees are representatives of the member states. The Trust Fund, so long as it is properly 
managed, finances the CCJ in perpetuity and ensures that the CCJ’s funding is not dependent 
upon the capacity and willingness of states (or any third party) to adequately provide 
resources.7 
 The Board of Trustees disburses funds to the CCJ, the budget must fall within the 
limits of what the Trust is able and willing to release to the Court. At the same time, the 
RJLSC has administrative responsibility over the CCJ. Consequently, the budget process of 
the CCJ is involves the Registry of the CCJ, the RJLSC and the Trust Fund.8 Initially the rules 
governing the adoption of the budget were ambiguous, but after the CCJ became operational a 
Protocol on the Interfacing and Interaction of the RJLSC, CCJ and the CCJ Trust Fund (CCJ, 
2007) was adopted to clarify the procedure. The Protocol states that the budget is prepared by 
the Court (though the Registry) and RJLSC, the discussed with the Executive Officer of the 
Trust Fund. Following the preparation, the budget is then submitted to the RJLSC for 
approval. After approval, the budget is submitted to the Board of Trustees for comment, and 
the RJLSC can approve revisions in light of the Board’s comments.9  
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Diffusion by emulation? 
Diffusion by emulation accounts for the resource management design of the CCJ to a 
limited degree, as we would expect from the comparative analysis in the previous section. The 
comparison of all ICs shows that resource management of the CCJ is unique. It is the only 
international court for which both budgetary approval and the appointment of the registrar is 
the responsibility of an independent body. Moreover, the CCJ’s resource management design 
does not resemble that of the CJEU. The CJEU’s budget is approved by co-decision of the 
Council of the European Union and the European Parliament, in consultation with the Court, 
and the registrar of the CJEU’s is appointed by the Court. As the above makes clear, this is 
dissimilar to the CCJ. This is important because elsewhere the CCJ has been labeled an 
emulation of the the CJEU (Alter, 2012). Primary documents and secondary material on the 
founding of the CCJ also make few to no references to the CJEU, especially in reference to 
the management of resources. For example, neither the Mills Report (CARICOM, 1990) nor 
the West Indian Commission (1992) in their recommendations to establish a court for 
CARICOM made reference to the CJEU.  
 This is however not to say that the CCJ does not have some similarities to the CJEU or 
that the creators of the CCJ did not draw any lessons from the CJEU. Indeed, the choice to 
give the CCJ original jurisdiction and the right of individual standing,10 as well as other 
institutional design features, were probably informed by the performance of the CJEU. 
Several points of divergence from the CJEU can nonetheless be seen in the design of the CCJ, 
such as its appellate jurisdiction, the selection and tenure of judges, rules governing 
preliminary rulings, among others. While the broader design of the CCJ is beyond the scope 
of this article, emulation of the CJEU has limited explanatory power in the case of the CCJ’s 
resource management design.11  
To test the generalizability of the diffusion by emulation as it relates to resource 
management, I assess whether the model types of each IC corresponds with its resource 
management design. To define model types, I use Alter’s (2014) four models, which are: the 
ECJ model (same as the CJEU), WTO model, Nuremburg model, and ECtHR model. In 
addition, I add a residual model reflecting other ICs, such as the ICJ and the ITLOS.  Based 
on this coding, I then assess whether resource management co-varies by model type.  Figure 1 
plots the selection of the registrar and budget approval against ICs’ model type.  
 
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
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 The figure illustrates that resource management does not co-vary with the model type 
of ICs. There are several instances where the model types do not correspond with any 
particular design on resource management. For example, ECJ model courts vary on resource 
management. All variations of the rules on who appoints the registrar and three of the four 
categories on budgetary approval exist in one or more of the ECJ model courts. On the other 
hand, some model types of ICs are associated with particular resource management rules. For 
example, states retain control over the budget of all WTO model courts. All Nuremburg 
model ICs have a budget approval process that entails consultation with the court but final 
decision-making remains with states. Similarly, the registrars of all ECtHR model courts are 
appointed by the courts themselves. This suggests that diffusion by emulation is likely only a 
partial account for the resource management features of ICs. Even though diffusion may 
strongly influence the resource management design in some cases and in other cases lead to 
the adoption of some but not all rules concerning the management of resources, the variation 
in general suggests other factors also influence resource management design.  
 On the other hand, domestic factors might influence resource management design. 
Using cross-national judicial independence data (Linzer and Staton, 2015), figure 2 plots the 
average judicial independence of member states against the resource management design of 
each IC. 
 
[FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 
 The figure illustrates that there is no clear association between member states’ 
domestic judicial independence and budgetary approval of ICs.  In terms of the selection of 
the registrar, the figure reveals that the domestic judicial independence does corresponds with 
whether or not states retain control over the appointment of an IC’s registrar. Those instances 
where states retain unilateral control over the registrar fall on the lower end of the judicial 
independence scale. Low judicial independence, however, does not always correspond with 
state appointment of the registrar. Yet, average higher domestic judicial independence tends 
to correspond with either partial or full court control over the selection of an IC’s registrar. In 
the following discussions, I explore whether the resource management design of the CCJ, 
especially in regards to the appointment of the registrar, reflects domestic judicial norms.  
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Uploading domestic judicial norms 
 The design of the CCJ’s resource management was shaped by a process of uploading a 
common domestic judicial norm.  National judiciaries vary in terms of their procedures and 
practices, including how judges and judicial administrative staff are appointed. An 
independent commission or council which appoints judges and/or court personnel is one 
particular arrangement that is found in domestic systems (Garoupa and Ginsburg, 2009). The 
RJLSC closely resembles such commissions. In fact, judicial commissions are a feature 
common to the national judiciaries of most CARICOM states.12 A former Attorney General of 
Barbados, and the chair of the committee which supervised the inauguration of the CCJ, 
stated: ‘More and more throughout the Commonwealth, it is being accepted that appointments 
to judicial office should be made through an independent, impartial, autonomous body. In the 
Constitutions of Commonwealth Caribbean States, a Judicial and Legal Service Commission 
is a common feature of such a body. In the case of the CCJ, a deliberate attempt was made to 
ensure that appointments were made by such a body’ (Simmons, 2005, p. 86).   
Table 3 illustrates all CARICOM member states, with the exception of Haiti and 
Suriname, have judicial and legal services commissions domestically. In four of the member 
states, these commissions select and appoint registrars and other court personnel. In seven 
other states, a commission recommends the appointment, but then a governor-general makes 
the formal appointment.13 
 
[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
 
One of the earliest proposals laying out the structure of the CCJ provided for a judicial 
commission with the authority to select the CCJ’s registrar. Trinidad and Tobago proposed 
the establishment of a Caribbean court of appeal at the Heads of Government Meeting 
(HOGM) of CARICOM in 1987 (Pollard, 2004, p. 2). The HOGM concluded this proposal 
should be considered and mandated the attorney generals of CARICOM states, in consultation 
with national judiciaries and representative bodies of the legal profession, to study and make 
recommendations on this proposal (CARICOM, 1987). Two years later, the HOGM ‘agreed 
to the establishment of a regional Judicial Service Commission’ (CARICOM, 1989). The 
HOGM in 1990 approved a draft inter-governmental agreement, which was recommended by 
a sub-Committee of Attorney Generals. This agreement provided that ‘the proposed Regional 
Judicial Service Commission be responsible for the Appointment of the Registrar and other 
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staff of the Court instead of the President of the Court as originally decided’ (cited in Pollard, 
2004, p. 4). 
At this point in time, however, it was not yet clear that the proposed court would have 
original jurisdiction. When states, upon the recommendation of the West Indian Commission 
(1992), decided to vest the Court with original jurisdiction in 1998, the RJLSC was already 
accepted as a central design element of the CCJ.14 It appears that model of a judicial 
commission, common to many member states combined with the participation of the national 
judicial officials served as an important influence on the design of the RJLSC.  
 
 
The CCJ and bureaucrats’ interests in independence and sustainability 
Bureaucrats (especially national legal and judicial officials) played an important role 
in designing the CCJ. These bureaucrats were in particular concerned with the political 
insulation of the CCJ and its financial sustainability. In fact, the decision to have the RJLSC 
and the Trust Fund integrated in the budget process was largely driven by the national legal 
officials who participated in the creation of the CCJ.  
As described above, national legal officials (e.g., attorney generals) were important to 
the decision to create the RJLSC. Moreover, the decision to establish the Trust Fund was 
guided by national legal officials (as well as international bureaucrats). When the CCJ Treaty 
was approved, the HOGM formed and mandated a preparatory committee to bring the Court 
into operation. The Committee was comprised of ‘the Attorneys General of Barbados, Guyana, 
Jamaica, St. Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia and Trinidad and Tobago, assisted by Chief 
Parliamentary Counsels and Supreme Court Registrars, and representatives of the Council of 
Legal Education and the CARICOM Secretariat’ (CARICOM, 1999).  
One concern that drew the attention of the Preparatory Committee was the financing of 
the CCJ. Discussions about the creation of the CCJ expressed apprehension that states would 
not adequately finance the Court. David Simmons (2005, p. 87), the Chairperson of the 
Preparatory Committee, and Duke Pollard (2004, p. 55), an official with the CARICOM 
Secretariat at the time, both remarked in their later writings on the establishment of the CCJ 
that Caribbean regional institutions had previously suffered from states’ delinquency in 
submitting their financial contributions. Moreover, as a report commissioned by the 
Preparatory Committee found, there was widespread concern about financial security of the 
Court (Rawlins, 2000). In a Barbados newspaper, for example, an editorial wrote ‘we are 
obliged to face the harsh reality that a Caribbean Court of Appeal will be an expensive 
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institution…’ (cited in Rawlins, 2000, p. 41). Previously, many Caribbean states were able to 
offload this expense to the UK since they used the Privy Council. Member states asserted that 
the Court would not become operation until they were satisfied that the Court would be 
adequately funded, and they requested the Ministers of Finance to consider arrangements to 
ensure its financial viability.  
Given this concern, the Preparatory Committee developed a potential strategy to deal 
with the financing of the CCJ (Simmons, 2005, p. 87; Pollard, 2004, p. 56). It suggested to the 
HOGM that it pursue the establishment of a trust fund to finance the Court. A year later, in 
2000, the Legal Affairs Committee drafted a Protocol which provided for the creation of a 
Trust Fund (Rawlins, 2000, pp. 42-43). The HOGM approached the Caribbean Development 
Bank with a proposal to provide loans to member states for the initial capital to finance the 
Trust Fund. In early 2002, the HOGM ‘established a Joint Committee consisting of 
Attorneys-General and Senior Finance Officials to meet with a representative of the 
Caribbean Development Bank (CDB) to work out the details regarding the financing of the 
Court’ (CARICOM 2002). Later in 2002, HOGM ‘authorised the President of the Caribbean 
Development Bank (CDB) to raise the funds on international capital markets’ for the initial 
capital for the Trust Fund (CARICOM, 2002b), and in 2003 the Agreement Establishing the 
Trust Fund was adopted. 
Both national and international bureaucrats, as reflected in the participation of the 
CDB, CARICOM secretariat officials and national attorney generals, played a key role in the 
creation of the CCJ, and especially in the design around the resource management of the 
Court. These bureaucrats, as well as legal elites more broadly, had a central concern for the 
independence of the Caribbean judiciaries and that of the CCJ (Simmons, 2005, p. 77; Caserta 
and Madsen 2016; Pollard, 2004; Rawlins, 2000).  Likewise, there were concerned about 
financial viability of the CCJ. These concerns, I argue, were at the heart of the resource 
management design of the CCJ. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This article has examined the resource management design of ICs. It has shown that ICs tend 
to have greater control over the appointment of their chief administrators, but states generally 
retain authority to approve ICs’ budgets. The analysis suggests that ICs’ resource 
management design is not explained fully by emulation. Rather, the CCJ case provides 
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compelling evidence that domestic judicial norms, especially when they enhance judicial 
independence, as well as bureaucrats who participate in the creation of a new IC and are 
concerned with the independence and financial sustainability of the court, contribute to a 
resource management design that minimizes high state control. The CCJ is a rather unique 
case, where isolating the influence of a domestic judicial norm and the influence of 
bureaucrats is especially illustrative.  
How generalizable is the CCJ case? The complementary evidence suggested domestic 
governance norms, especially, have influence in more cases: domestic governance norms that 
weaken judicial independence appear to be associated with an IC design that ensures stronger 
state control over resources. Moreover, some existing work on the creation of ICs points to 
evidence that the actors who are involved in the design process play a vital role in 
determining the design of ICs. For example, in the creation of the ECtHR, “important work 
was done” by the  Committee of Legal Experts that was convened by the Committee of 
Ministers, and the Committee of Legal Experts “produced what were really the first proper 
Convention draft” (Bates 2011, pp. 27). Similarly, in the creation of the International Criminal 
Court, the UN’s Preparatory Committee, of which the “majority of delegates were therefore 
legal advisors while often higher ranking political advisors were in the minority”, 
significantly contributed to the design of the Court (Deitelhoff 2009, pp. 55-56). Both of these 
accounts suggest that bureaucratic legal experts were instrumental in the design process, and 
often shifted the outcomes to something other than what would have been created in their 
absence. The CCJ case study points to the plausibility of the theoretical argument, but in-
depth case studies into the establishment of other ICs, is necessary to further substantiate the 
generalizability of the role of bureaucrats and domestic governance norms. 
This article has implications for research. First, this article contributes to literature on 
the design of international institutions, illustrating domestic governance norms and 
bureaucrats are instrumental to the establishment of international institutions. This argument 
strikes parallels to a growing literature on new interdependence which shows that sub-state 
actors and domestic institutions shape institutions across borders (Farrell and Newman 2014). 
Additionally, it builds on existing work that suggests that domestic governance norms (e.g., 
Tallberg et al., 2016) and bureaucrats matter to the design of institutions (e.g., Johnson, 2014). 
This article extends the realm of applicability of these arguments to international courts. 
Second, this article contributes to literature of institutional design by arguing that resource 
management is an important dimension of institutional design. Moreover, I have introduced a 
method for measuring and comparatively assessing this design feature. While this measure is 
18 
 
specific to ICs, a similar approach which identifies the rules structuring the control over 
budgetary decisions and human resources could be applied to other types of international 
institutions.   
Third, this article contributes to IC literature by bringing resources to the fore. While 
some research has paid attention to the financing of ICs (e.g., Romano 2005), the control over 
resources, in particular, has been almost void from literature. Even though this article focuses 
on design in particular, it aims to begin a broader conversation about the resourcing of ICs. 
For example, the control and management of resources might affect how ICs perform. As 
other contributions to this issue suggest (Ege and Bauer; Conceicao-Heldt and Schmidtke), 
the control over resources might also affect institutional independence. In this sense, bringing 
resources to future research on ICs might shed light on our understanding of their 
independence. Also, resourcing is significant to understand problem-solving in a wide array 
of issue areas, including development and health (see Michaelowa, this volume), but it is 
likely to matter for global justice as well. Actors who control the budget of a court influence 
how funds are allocated, such as whether funds are used for fact-finding, expert testimony, 
support staff, or public relations, all of which can be essential to the speedy and fair 
administration of justice. Attention to ICs resourcing and resource management thus might 
have important implications for understanding the impact and performance of ICs.  
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Appendix 
Court 
 
Abbreviation 
Year in 
operation  
Budgetary 
Approval   
Selection of 
Registrar 
African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights  ACtHPR 2006 Joint  Court 
Andean Tribunal of Justice ATJ 1984 Joint Court 
Benelux Court of Justice BCJ 1974 States Joint 
Central American Court of Justice CACJ 1992 Joint Court 
Caribbean Court of Justice CCJ 2005 Other Other 
Central African Economic and Monetary 
Community Court of Justice  
CEMAC CJ 2000 States Court 
Court of Justice of the European Union  CJEU 1952 Joint Court 
Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa 
Court of Justice  
COMESA CJ 1998 Joint States 
East African Court of Justice  EACJ 2001 States States 
Economic Court of the Commonwealth of 
Independent States  
ECCIS 1993 States Court 
Economic Community of West African States 
Court of Justice  
ECOWAS CJ 2002 States Court 
European Court of Human Rights  ECtHR 1959 States Court 
European Free Trade Agreement Court of Justice  EFTA CJ 1994 Joint Court 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights  IACtHR 1979 Joint Court 
International Criminal Court  ICC 2002 Joint Joint 
International Court of Justice  ICJ 1947 Joint Court 
International Criminal Tribunal of Rwanda ICTR 1994 Joint Other*  
International Criminal Tribunal of the former 
Yugoslavia  
ICTY 1993 Joint Other*  
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea   ITLOS 1996 Joint Court 
Mercosur Permanent Review Tribunal  Mercosur PRT 2002 States Joint 
Organization for the Harmonization of Business 
Law in Africa Common Court of Justice and 
Arbitration  
OHADA CCJA 
1996 States Joint 
Tribunal of the Southern African Development 
Community 
SADC T 2005 States Court 
Western African Economic and Monetary Union 
Court of Justice 
WAEMU CJ 1995 States Court 
World Trade Organization Appellate Body (WTO AB 1994 States Other*  
* The responsible entity is required to consult with the court.  
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Figure 1. Scatterplots of registrar appointment and budgetary approval against five IC 
model types (N=24) 
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Table 1: Resource Management of ICs (N=24) 
 Budget Registrar 
States decide 11 (45.8%) 2 (8.33) 
States decide with 
consultation of court 
12 (50) 4 (16.67) 
Courts decides 0 14 (58.33) 
Other entity decides 1 (4.17) 4 (16.67) 
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Table 2: Resource Management of ICs 
 Budget 
Registrar  States decide Joint decision Court decides Other entity  
States decide EACJ COMESA CJ    
Joint decision BCJ  
Mercosur PRT 
OHADA CCJA 
ICC***    
Court decides CEMAC CJ 
ECCIS  
ECOWAS CJ 
ECtHR 
SADC T 
WAEMU CJ 
 
ACtHPR 
ATJ 
CACJ 
CJEU 
EFTAC 
IACtHR 
ICJ 
ITLOS 
   
Other entity WTO AB** ICTR*, ICTY*  CCJ  
      
Notes: *The registrar is appointed on recommendation of the tribunals and approval of the UN Secretary-General.   
**The Director of the Secretariat to the WTO AB is appointed by the Director-General of the WTO Secretariat 
in consultation with the Chairperson of the Dispute Settlement Body (an intergovernmental decision -making 
body), see Establishment of WTO AB, para. 17. 
***The ICC’s registrar is recommended by the Assembly of State Parties but appointed by the Court.  
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Table 3. National appointment procedures for registrars 
 Registrar appointed 
by national Judicial 
and Legal Services 
Commission 
National Judicial and 
Legal Services 
Commission advises 
on appointment of  
registrar, confirmed 
by other entity 
No national judicial 
and legal services 
commission 
Antigua  X*   
Bahamas  X*  
Barbados  X*  
Belize X   
Dominica  X   
Grenada  X*  
Guyana X   
Haiti   X 
Jamaica  X*  
St. Lucia X   
St. Kitts and Nevis  X*  
St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines 
 X*  
Suriname   X 
Trinidad and Tobago X   
* Appointment confirmed by Governor-General.  
Note: This table excludes Montserrat as information was unavailable. 
Source: Authors own compilation. Constitutions found at the Constitute Project, Available from: 
https://www.constituteproject.org/ (accessed August 2016).  
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Figure 2. Scatterplots of registrar selection and budgetary approval based against 
judicial independence (member state average) (N=24) 
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1
 Permanence is defined by whether judges hold permanent positions as opposed to being selected on an ad hoc 
basis per each dispute (Romano, 2011, p. 262).  
2
 Courts might be consulted informally in the other courts, even though the codified rules do not mandate it.  
3
 Caserta and Madsen (2016) provide a thorough discussion of the historical, political, and legal context in which 
the CCJ was formed. 
4
 As of September 2016, four states (Barbados, Guyana, Belize and Dominica) have accepted the CCJ’s appellate 
jurisdiction. 
5
 De Mestral (2015) offers a thorough discussion of the dual nature of the CCJ.  
6
 The President of the CCJ is most likely influential in the decision-making of the RJLSC. For this reason, it is 
not independent of the Court per se. The key point here however is that it is institutionally independent from 
states.  
7
 Other contributions to this issue consider the impact of third party funders on IOs, see Martens and Seitz, this 
issue; Graham, this issue. 
8
 Anonymous Interview, April 1, 2016. Port of Spain, Trinidad and Tobago. 
9
 The Registrar is likely influential in the decision-making of the CCJ’s budget. For this reason, the Trust Fund is 
not independent of the Court per se. The key point here however is that it is institutionally independent from 
states.  
10
 While both courts have some form of standing for individuals, their rules governing individual standing, 
nonetheless, differ. The CCJ allows for direct individual standing in actions against states and community 
actions with leave. On the other hand, individuals have been granted access since 1989 to bring direct actions 
against the EU to the ECJ’s Court of First Instance (renamed the General Court of the CJEU in 2009). However, 
individuals cannot directly bring suits against states before the General Court, nor do they have the right of direct 
standing at the ECJ (meaning the superior court) in any action. See O’Brien and Morano -Foadi (2009, pp. 409-
410) for more. 
11
 O’Brien and Morano-Foadi (2009) provide a good comparative discussion of the CJEU and the CCJ.  
12
 Reginald T.A. Armour S.C., President of the Law Association of Trinidad and Tobago, Interview, April 5, 
2016. Port of Spain, Trinidad and Tobago.  
13
 The Governor-General is a representative of the British monarch. This position is by-and-large a ceremonial 
role. 
14
 This suggest that the role of domestic institutions in part enabled by the dual functions of the CCJ, 
contributing in part to the overall uniqueness of the CCJ in terms of resource management design. 
